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Introduction
Any visitor to the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts, encounters
Daniel Chester French’s statue entitled “Minute Man.” This Minuteman stands as the epitome of
a citizen soldier with concrete allegiances both to home and community. He stands holding a
musket in one hand and a plow in the other affirming the romanticized view of a noble
Revolutionary soldier who marched straight from the fields to serve in Washington’s Continental
Army.
Growing up in Massachusetts, I was taught that the militias selflessly put the needs of the
nation before their own. They protected liberty and freedom for all. They were the backbone of
the Revolution. But then how could these men, the more than 20,000 who gathered in Cambridge
following Lexington and Concord, not reenlist for the subsequent year? Why did Washington
report that as of November 28, 1775 only 2,530 men had reenlisted to fight for the Continental
Army in 1776?1 This thesis explores the fleeting enthusiasm of 1775, how it developed, why it
was so ephemeral, and how Washington was left with only 2,530 men reenlisted come
November. 2
Traditionally, historians have analyzed the development of the colonial forces in 1775
from two main perspectives: from the perspective of the Revolution’s leaders and alternatively,
from the perspective of the forces themselves. An important element in both schools is the
different understandings of the militia structure prevalent in the colonies during this time. This
thesis explores the history of the militia system to understand how colonists developed both
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Eric I. Manders, “Evidence for Numbering Systems in the Cambridge Army, 1775- 1776,” in
Military Collector & Historian 55.1 (Spring 2003) 2; George Washington, “To John Hancock:
November 28, 1775,” The Papers of George Washington, Philander D. Chase, ed.
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia) 2: 446. [Hereby cited as WP]
2
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formal and informal military organizations. This thesis includes the perspectives of both the
Founding Fathers and the patriots, to develop an understanding of how the decisions of leaders
and the actions of everyday men intersected to create the colonial forces in 1775. Drawing upon
a wide body of work, this thesis examines the fleeting enthusiasm of 1775, and tries to uncover
why men who rushed to arms at the beginning of that year retreated almost as quickly.
To explore this question, this thesis questions the romanticized revolutionary image of
the “citizen soldier” as depicted in French’s statue. “Citizen soldiers” were colonists who “in
ordinary times… did their own work- usually farming- without military office or public
expense…. [But] they would mobilize to face a threat and become the first defenders.”3 The role
of the “citizen soldier” in the Revolution and specifically 1775 is highly debated. Not only do
historians argue about citizens’ motivations for enlisting (and leaving) the army, but they also
argue about the impact of Washington's reforms had on converting the citizen soldiers to long
term soldiers. Given this, there are multiple answers to the question, why were men propelled to
fight?
Most explicitly, Robert Middlekauff in his essay “Why Men Fought in the American
Revolution” tries to address what motivated men to join the Revolutionary cause in early 1775.4
Middlekauff’s essay not only explores why men gathered, but he takes his analysis further and
examines the units that stayed unified under intense pressure, to determine what kept them
together under increased stress and demand. Studying these distinct units, Middlekauff concludes
that men who remained in camp fought out of responsibility to both their community and to their
fellow soldiers. Middlekauff argues that men were not driven by religion, citing many of these
3

Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American
Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011), 36.
4
Robert Middlekauff, “Why Men Fought in the American Revolution,” Huntington Library
Quarterly 43.2 (Spring 1980): 135-148.
2

highly religious units disintegrated under fire. Middlekauff’s article is essential to understanding
the importance of the personal bonds between members and the weak influence of religion in
1775. Although Middlekauff's argument addresses the men at Cambridge, many of the men who
arrived in Cambridge in the weeks following Lexington and Concord were products of a larger
military tradition that did not begin with the events of April 19, 1775.
Although the citizen soldier is sometimes seen as a development of the Revolutionary
War, it had deep roots in the New World. Louis Morton in his article, “The Origins of American
Military Policy” argues that from the establishment of colonial settlements, the Crown tasked
colonists with developing their own systems of defense.5 Rather than an established country with
an army, the colonies were small independent settlements that had to rely on their inhabitants for
protection. Settlements were thus defended by their inhabitants, therefore fostering both a
tradition of military service and developing a deep sense of loyalty to local communities.
Pauline Maier argues that along with militias, colonies also developed a tradition of
informal crowd action as a way to preserve order in communities. She argues in her article
“Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth Century America” that “leading eighteenth
century Americans had known many occasions on which mobs [or crowds] took on the defense
of the public welfare…. [and became] an integral and even respected element of the political
order.”6 As Maier would have predicted, with the growing frustrations of colonists in the 1770s,
the militia became an essential vehicle for colonists to express their growing frustrations and
protect their economic interests.
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Louis Morton, “The Origins of American Military Policy” Military Affairs 22.2 (Summer
1958): 75-82.
6
Pauline Maier, “Popular Uprising and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America,” The
William and Mary Quarterly 27.1 (January 1970): 4.
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The second major field of historiography focuses on the impact of George Washington on
the Continental Army. Historians such as Justin Florence and Fred Anderson see Washington’s
appointment as a concrete example of the shifting ideologies of 1775.
Justin Florence suggests in his article, “Minutemen for Months: The Making of the
American Revolution Army before Washington,” that between Lexington and Concord and
Washington’s appointment, colonists began to organize themselves, developing hierarchical
systems of command, and standardizing the actions and day-to-day life of soldiers.7 Regardless
of these attempts to organize the forces, Florence ultimately concludes that there was a “sharp
dichotomy…. Between the militia that fought at Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, and
the Continental Army that Washington subsequently organized.”8 The appointment of
Washington not only legitimized the organization of forces in the spring, but he brought the
necessary order and structure to develop the Continental Army.
Similarly, Fred W. Anderson argues in his article “The Hinge of the Revolution” that
Washington’s appointment shifted the base of the revolution from the informal organization of
the spring to the formal national organization of the summer.9 Anderson argues that the “popular
forces” of 1775, known as the militias, existed in the purist form only prior to the appointment of
George Washington on July 3, 1775.10 Although Anderson recognizes that his argument focuses
on “July, 3, a day on which nothing much happened,” he argues that Washington’s

7

Justin Florence, “Minutemen for Months: The Making of an American Revolutionary Army
before Washington, April 20- July 2, 1775” In History, Memory and a House Museum: Artemas
Ward of Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, ed. American Antiquarian Society, (Worcester: American
Antiquarian Society, 2005) 59- 99.
8
Florence, 60.
9
Fred Anderson, “The Hinge of the Revolution: George Washington Confronts a People’s Army,
July 3, 1775,” Massachusetts Historical Review 1 (1999): 20-48.
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Anderson, “The Hinge of the Revolution,” 45.
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organizational changes drastically altered the trajectory of colonial military thought.11
Washington arrived to reform “a whole set of pernicious Yankee attitudes towards military
service, and indeed a complex beliefs about the nature of war itself.”12 Additionally, Washington
arrived to provide order to men who prior to his arrival were “under very little discipline, order,
or Government… [and who were] not natural soldiers.”13 Washington’s introduction of formal
European-style training, and his deconstruction of the previous laissez faire warfare suggests that
the force of 1775 were untrained, but prior to 1775 the colonies had an established military
tradition.
Many mainstream Revolutionary histories focus on the various acts and taxes imposed by
the Crown following the French and Indian War, rather than the military history of the colonies.
While these acts did have a significant impact on the colonial situation, they were not the main
call to arms. Rather the American Revolution was a result of the colonies formal and informal
political and military organization that towards the end of the 18th century designed to protect
colonists’ own interests. The convergence of formal militias and informal crowds resulted in
both the enthusiastic rush to arms in the spring of 1775 and the subsequent desertion from and
apathy for the Continental’s military efforts.
Therefore, the contemporary historiography is generally focused on two main themes:
uncovering men’s motivations for marching to Cambridge, and examining the arrival of
Washington, his observations, and his subsequent changes. But unfortunately primary sources
make it difficult to tell this story.

11

Anderson, “The Hinge of the Revolution,” 24.
Anderson, “The Hinge of the Revolution,” 24-25.
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Anderson, “The Hinge of the Revolution,” 28.
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While the historiography does capture the changing military structure in 1775, there is a
significant lack of primary sources. While there are full accounts of the Revolution from men
such as Joseph Plumb Martin who enlisted after 1775, there are few published records of men
who served just in 1775. Although a few records do exist, many are not published and thus not
accessible for this thesis.14 Thus, I have worked to incorporate primary sources when I have
found them in secondary sources. Additionally, I have relied heavily on Washington’s papers in
the second half of the thesis. Not only do Washington’s letters illuminate the time frame of this
thesis from July 1775 to January 1776, but his letters describe the situation in Cambridge, detail
his frustrations with the forces, and capture his strong rhetoric. Washington’s frustrations with
the militias and the forces of 1775 are no secret; he strongly articulated their weaknesses and his
disappointments with them through his letters. I have also incorporated statistics when possible,
but because there are few records from 1775, there are few statistics. Additionally, the statistics
that are published are sometimes questionable. For example in Howard Peckham’s The Toll of
Independence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution, he only records
seven desertions during 1775. While it is unclear exactly how many men deserted from
Cambridge, Washington wrote numerous times in the fall about the high rate of desertion, which
were not caused by only seven men.15 With a force of nearly 20,000 in April, seven would make
little impact, therefore highlighting the difference between the primary source accounts of the
situation and military records. Regardless of these limitations, this thesis combines both the
available primary sources with the contemporary historiography to understand the declining
motivations of New England forces in 1775.

14
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See Appendix in Justin Florence’s “Minutemen for Months” for list of 1775 records.
Middlekauff, 144; Washington, “General Orders,” WP, 1:346
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Because New England was at the center of protest and rebellion prior, and during the first
year of the Revolution, this thesis analyzes the actions of New Englanders. This is not to say that
other colonies were not frustrated with the British, but the people of Boston publicly expressed
their frustrations to a degree unseen in the other colonies. Additionally, from a research
perspective, there is an abundance of literature on both the development of New England during
the colonial period, and growing tensions between patriots and the Crown during the early
months of 1775.
A discussion on terms is in order. While historiography has many names for colonists
including insurgents and rebels, this thesis refers to these protesting colonists as patriots. While
insurgents and rebels may have been appropriate at the time, this nomenclature carries moral
implications in the 21st century. While the term patriot carries its own implications, it does not as
directly imply the morality of men, or the legitimacy of their actions.
To explore the changing relationships between patriots and society, the thesis
deconstructs the historical foundation for military service and protest, and its role in 1775.
Chapter 1 explores the foundation of both formal and informal colonial military forces, and the
convergence of the militia and crowd traditions. Chapter 2 illustrates how men were willing to
fight to protect their own communities, but had little interest in fighting to protect strangers.
Chapter 3 investigates Washington’s challenges as he tried to convert the men in Cambridge
from a political to a military force. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses the challenges that Washington
faced maintaining the Continental Army through the fall and winter, as men saw little need for
them to remain or even extend their service. The unification of both formal militias and informal
crowds during the first few months of 1775 created an enthusiasm that was not driven by the

7

excitement of battle, but rather it was driven by the desire to protect the political rights of local
communities.

8

Chapter 1: Development of Formal and Informal Colonial Protection
1775 is often remembered in contemporary history for patriots’ quick rush to arms, both
at Lexington and Concord, and in Cambridge. Historians agree “the assembling of the army
before Boston was a miracle of quickness, the amazing gathering of a formidable force,” a force
that was “crucial to New England’s success.”16 This force was so surprising that Alan French
argues that “[n]ever had there been anything like it.” 17 But there had been. Both militias and
crowds developed prior to the revolution to respond to invasions and preserve order, but they
functioned independently. While militias initially formed in the 17th century to protect fledgling
settlements against attack, crowds grew in the 18th century, to provide social, political, and
economy order to the expanding colonies. Although these two systems functioned independently
prior to the Revolution, following the Articles of Association, enacted on December 1, 1774,
these two forces converged. This unified regulatory force in the colonies. 1775 was defined by
the combination of traditional militias and modern crowds to create an unprecedented force that
combined both the formal and informal military structures of New England.
Arriving in the New World, settlers were tasked by the British Crown to protect
themselves. Settlements received orders from the Crown to use arms in any way that they
deemed necessary for their protection. The Massachusetts Bay Charter in 1628 goes so far to
assert that men were “to take whatever measures were required ‘to incounter, expulse, repell and
resist by force of arms’… any effort to destroy or invade the settlement.”18 In addition to the
Crown, the businessmen who financed the colonies protected their investments by ensuring that
16

Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1934), 25; John W. Shy, “A New Look at Colonial Militia”, The William and Mary Quarterly
Vol. 20 No. 2 (April 1963): 179.
17
French, 25.
18
Louis Morton, “The Origins of American Military Policy,” Military Affairs Vol 22. No. 2
(Summer, 1958): 75.
9

“weapons and military stores were therefore included in the cargo of ships.”19 Provided supplies
and the freedom to organize, colonists developed the militia system.
Militias were developed to provide a robust system of protection against spontaneous
local raids and attacks. With so few settlers, a standing army was not an option. Instead, many
settlements required “the entire adult male population … to maintain arms.” 20 Therefore men
collectively shared the responsibility to protect and preserve their settlement, but only when it
was necessary. As such, they were primarily concerned with matters that involved themselves
and their immediate community. Additionally, militias could not intervene in colonial matters
outside their borders.
These geographic limitations were developed by the Crown to avoid unnecessary
conflicts in the New World. The Crown was clear that militias were for protection not
aggression: “English law…restricted the use of the militia to inhibit the Crown from employing
it outside the kingdom.” 21 In other words, militias could only fight on their own territory. The
clear geo-political limitations of militias not only determined their defensive position but also
fostered little connection between neighboring militias.
Local militias generally did not protect each other; instead, militias only fought when it
was in the best interest of their community. This extreme localism was not only fueled by the
political and geographical barriers between colonies, but also by the militias themselves. As one
North Carolinian argued: “Let the New Yorkers defend themselves… Why should I fight the
Indians for them?”22 While this may seem overly geocentric, during the early 17th century

19

Morton, 75.
Robert K. Wright Jr., “Nor is their Standing Army to be Despised,” in Arms and Independence,
ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 52.
21
Morton, 76.
22
Morton, 76.
20
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survival was not guaranteed and thus this approach was necessary. With the unknowns of the
New World, colonists looked first to protecting their own interests before they even considered
supporting each other. With little potential of outside assistance, communities developed
standard training to enforce and resolve military participation.
The Crown placed male colonists under some form of obligatory training.23 In 1631 The
Massachusetts Bay Colony passed their first military law that required “all males between 16 and
60, whether freeman or servants…to provide themselves with weapons and to form into units for
training.”24 When these training units, known as militias, were first established they “called for
weekly training periods, held every Saturday.” 25 Massachusetts Bay records suggest that the
frequency of these trainings was directly reflective of the perceived threat that colonists faced.26
In 1637 as the Massachusetts Bay Colony “had become more settled, the number of trainings per
year [decreased and now] was fixed to eight.”27 These trainings, viewed as necessary to protect
the colonies, were unfortunately based on British models that proved generally ineffective in the
New World.
Following the British military tradition, militia commanders adopted traditional British
drills. These drills, according to Morton, were “a remarkably complicated series of motions for
forming troops, marching, fixing the pike, and firing the musket.”28 While this sort of training
was “standard in European armies, where the perfection of mechanical motions governed
warfare… [they] bore no relation to Indian fighting in the forests of the New World.”29

23

Wright Jr., 52.
Morton, 78.
25
Morton, 79.
26
Morton, 79.
27
Morton, 79.
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Morton, 79.
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Morton, 79.
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Regardless of their effectiveness, settlers and colonists continued to follow British training
manuals through the 17th century. In the 18th century, as the colonies were more established, there
was little need for militias.
In the early18th century militia drills brought together communities for a day of
celebration. Training days turned into “festive local holidays.” 30 Men would gather for a series of
drills where colonists “lined up with their muskets and powder horns, executed some awkward
drills, listened to the pastor preach a sermon, and spent the rest of the day in eating and
drinking.”31 While these trainings proved to be part of 18th century culture, they did not hold the
same power that they did in the 17th century. While in the public order in the 17th century, public
order was maintained by the communal identity of settlers who put the needs of the community
before their own, the 18th century saw the rise of liberalism and the development of colonists’
individuality.
In the 18th century, colonists began to develop a need for a local government body to look
out for the local concerns and affairs of colonists. Colonists, citing the liberal belief that “nature
had endowed human beings with the capacity to think for themselves and act in their own
behalf,” became increasingly independent.32 Liberalism gave power to individuals to express
their opinions, gave colonists agency, and accordingly strengthened the growing calls for local
systems of governance in the colonies. Citing this need, colonists developed both formal and
informal systems of governance at the local level to govern daily life.

30

Morton, 79: Arthur Bernon Tourtellot, Lexington and Concord; The Beginning of the War of
the American Revolution (New York: New York, W.W. Norton, 1963), 47.
31
Toutellot, pg. 47.
32
Joyce Oldham Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 1.
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Male landowners, who were increasingly concerned about land allocations, formed
formal town meetings to settle these disputes. 33 These town meetings were comprised of
“artisans and tavern owners, small merchants, and retailers.” 34 According to Richard Bourne
these men and their “liberalizing tongues” sought to develop a formal system of local
governance.35 While these town meetings had little impact on the development of military forces,
they do illustrate the growing desire for colonists to develop as individuals, and to make their
own decisions. Since town meetings were primarily concerned with land allocation, there was an
increasing need for additional systems of governance to address the political, economic, and
social developments of 18th century society.
In the 1700’s crowds proved this governance to be necessary to preserve the colonies’
growing society and economy. Paul Gilje argues that during the early 18th century, crowds were
focused upon three primary issues, “issues of customary rights concerning both the market and
natural resources, the morality of the people in the neighborhoods, and expressions of loyalty.”36
As Gilje’s observations suggest, while crowds did not protect colonies from attacks, they
functioned to preserve colonial order. Pauline Maier argues in her article entitled “Popular
Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America” that this concern with public
order turned crowds into “extralegal arm of the community’s interest.” 37 Assuming many of the
responsibilities of a local government, crowds managed the social, political, and economic
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Russell Bourne, Cradle of Violence: How Boston's Waterfront Mobs Ignited the American
Revolution (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2006), 22.
34
Bourne, 22.
35
Bourne, 22.
36
Paul A. Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 28.
37
Maier, “Popular Uprising”4-5.
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order.38 As Maier continues to argue, crowds were concerned with “the public welfare, which
was, after all, the stated purpose of government.” 39 The importance of crowds may be seen in its
treatment of the rapid population growth in the early 18th century.
Between 1700 and 1740 the population of New England expanded from 99,000 to
282,000.40 This increasing population put significant strain on the resources of the region. Dating
back to 1640 “with a population of 1,200… [Boston] had outgrown its food resources.”41 From
1640 on, Boston relied on importing food for both its residents and for the nearly 500 ships
departed Boston bound for England each year. 42 This created a natural tension between Boston
residents and the near British-bound ships, as they had to compete for wheat.
This tension culminated in the Wheat Riot of April 30, 1710. On April 30, a crowd
attacked the grain ship of Andrew Belcher, cutting the ship’s rudder and seizing the wheat on
board.43 Judge Samuel Sewall, a Massachusetts judge, observed that the crowd attacked because
“Capt. Belchar’s … [ship was] laden with Wheat in this time when Wheat is so dear.”44 Although
technically the British Crown was responsible for governing the colonies, as the Wheat Riot of
April 30 suggests, there was a need for local governance and allocation of resources that the
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Crown simply did not address on the local scale. Because the local governance was so essential,
crowds became “an integral and even respected element of the political order.” 45
Therefore, because crowds were seen as so essential to preserving communities, it was
often the town leaders, who held leadership positions in the town meeting or militia, who led
crowds. In the case of Exeter, New Hampshire, during a contentious visit from “a King’s
surveyor of the woods,” a member of the Gillman family, who was a militia officer and a mill
owner, organized a crowd against the Surveyor. 46 The ability of this member of the Gillman
family to assemble a crowd, given his position, suggests that crowds were in fact seen as a
legitimate vehicle in the 18th century for landowning colonists to voice their concerns over their
governance. Further as the situation in Exeter suggests, as colonists were establishing these
formal and informal systems of governance, they were also starting to articulate their own voice.
Therefore emerging from the first half of the 18th century, colonies established both
formal (town meetings) and informal (crowds) structures to voice their opinions and provide
local governance for New England settlers. Colonies were finding additional independent ways
to provide local governance, monitoring their own economic, political, and social wellbeing until
the Imperial Crisis threatened this budding independent governance.
Faced with 90 million pounds of debt from the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the
British turned to the colonies to recuperate their losses.47 Beginning in 1765 with the Stamp Act,
continuing with the Townsend Acts from 1767 to 1770, the Tea Act in 1773, and the Coercive
Acts of 1774, the British sought to make colonists pay for the costly war and assert their control
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over the colonies. While each of these acts sparked a different response, together they fostered
discontent in the colonies and created an environment rich for rebellion, especially in Boston.
Bostonians’ frustrations with the Tea Act of 1773 were notably visible and are highly
celebrated in Revolutionary folklore. The Tea Act was designed to relieve the East India
Company of its huge oversupply of tea and crack down on the smuggling of tea.48 Colonists paid
a tax on imported tea to the British Crown. Patriots argued that this act established the “principle
of collecting taxes in America.” 49 While other colonies simply sent the tea back to Britain,
Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson insisted that the tea stay. In an act known as the
Boston Tea Party, and described by John Adams as a “most magnificent Movement of all,”
Bostonians made sure that Hutchinson’s orders would not be followed- there would be no tea in
Boston.50 On the night of December 16, 1773, a group of Bostonians disguised as Native
Americans boarded an East India Company ship and dumped its whole supply of tea into the
Boston Harbor. The Boston Tea Party, not only brought to life colonist’s frustrations, but how
colonists used informal crowds and protest to redefine their relationship to the Crown.
In response to the Tea Party, Parliament instated the Intolerable Acts. The Intolerable
Acts were a series of acts in 1774 designed to assert control of the Crown and punish Boston. In
particular, the Boston Port Act that came into effect June 1, 1774, targeted the Boston Port, a
central hub for both international and colonial trade. This act brought the Boston shipyards to a
standstill, leaving many men out of work and causing a serious shortage of food.
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In response, Governor Thomas Gage, appointed by the Crown to handle the affairs of
Massachusetts, sent colonists out of Boston to the country where the demands for supplies were
not as high.51 But Gage, a perennial optimist, failed to accept the growing unrest in the country.
By enabling Patriots to leave Boston, Gage was polarizing the geography of greater Boston (with
loyalists in Boston, and Patriots in the country). In addition, he potentially was strengthening the
Patriot cause. While there is no concrete evidence of the interaction between Boston crowds and
the militias of Greater Boston, given their common cause and now close proximity, they may
have collaborated in the months leading up to the Revolution. Therefore, this exodus potentially
provided the perfect foundation for the Revolution. With the Patriot cause growing, The
Continental Congress saw a need to develop systems to organize men.
In light of the increasing threat of British control, Patriots began to reconsider their
organization. Although the colonies had informal crowds and formal militias, they had no way to
unite the two against the Crown in early 1774. For “Militia officers, even where they were
elected, held royal commissions” and as such were prohibited from acting against the Crown. 52
John Shy observes that militias “did not simply slide smoothly into the Revolution, but rather
had to redefine the organizational structure of units.”53 So colonists restructured their militias to
enable these units to protect colonial settlements from any threat, including the British.
On October 20, 1774, the First Continental Congress published the Articles of
Association, which repurposed militias. The Articles converted the historic militia that many saw
as “draft board and a reserve training unit…[into] a police force and an instrument of political
51

Jacqueline Barbara Carr, After the Siege: A Social History of Boston 1775-1800 (Boston:
Northeastern University press, 2005), 25.
52
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53
Shy, “Hearts and Minds,” 213.
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surveillance.”54 The Articles called for the formation of “a committee…in every county, city, and
town, by those who are qualified to vote for representatives in the legislature…. [who are
responsible for monitoring] foes to the rights of British-America [so that any violations] may be
publicly known, and [be] universally condemned as the enemies of American liberty.”55 In other
words, men now had ability to rise against the Crown when necessary. To create this
organization, communities had to begin “purging and restructuring the militia.”56 While this
process has received relatively little attention in revolutionary historiography, it was an essential
step in restructuring militias, for it enabled crowds and militias to fuse together to create the
passionate armed forces of 1775.
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Chapter 2: From Association to Washington’s Arrival
In the months following Association, unrest captured New England. The unity between
crowds and militia created an environment rich for revolution. Events leading up to
Washington’s appointment suggest that while men were willing to fight locally to protect their
community, they had little interest in fighting for strangers. Following the winter of 1774,
Patriots demonstrated that while they were willing to go to extremes to protect their own
resources and communities, they were not that interested in protecting their neighbors.
In 1774, with the growing tensions between colonial patriots and the British army, both
sides monitored each other’s arms and supplies. During 1774, it was common and within their
rights of the British to collect Patriots’ supplies, as the colonies were under British control.
Though legally acceptable, many colonists found that this threatened their growing
independence; they wanted to have control over their community’s military supplies. For
colonists in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the “unremarkable building” known as Fort William
and Mary held their colony’s entire supply of powder. 57 Therefore, when it was rumored that
General Gage ordered two regiments from Boston to Fort William and Mary in December 1774
to presumably collect supplies, colonists reacted. 58
On December 13, 1774, Paul Revere rushed to Portsmouth to warn colonists that “British
Ships were on their way to take the arms, ammunition, and powder stored at the fort back to
Boston.”59 Receiving word of these plans, New Hampshire colonists quickly organized on
December 14, 1774, to reclaim their gunpowder before the British arrived. Assembling “a
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curious band- local militiamen, armed strangers, committeemen from neighboring towns” by
drumbeat, patriots marched to the fort. 60 Initially, 200 men departed for the fort, but they
gathered support as they walked. 61 The spreading support for this march suggests that it was a
true New England crowd comprised of men who were connected through both their desire for
independence and their location. The force of 350 who arrived at the fort in a “festive air.” 62
Confronting the six British soldiers stationed at the fort, the colonists easily gained
control of the building. Taking the British soldiers captive, they “seized almost a hundred barrels
of powder, several small cannons, and an impressive supply of small arms.”63 Glowing with their
success, the colonists reportedly “gave three huzzas and hauled down the King’s colors.”64 While
this march may be seen as an act of rebellion against the British, it was foremost a march to
establish autonomy. The men in New Hampshire marched to assert their independence and
control over their own supplies.
The following day, men from all over New Hampshire rushed to Portsmouth, many
having heard that the British regiments were trying to dismantle the fort. In the morning on
December 15, nearly 2,000 colonists gathered in Yarmouth. 65 Historian T.H. Breen argues that
these 2,000 men represented “one out of every six adult males in New Hampshire… [who halted]
normal farm work, travel scores of miles over icy roads, and assault the king’s property.”66 By
seeking to control their own colony’s supplies, New Hampshire residents asserted their military
independence from the British.
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From a British perspective the events at Fort William and Mary demonstrated the
changing face of unrest in the colonies. Following Association, militias and crowds were able to
unite and march together, for militias no longer served the Crown. Governor Wentworth of New
Hampshire observed this change as he complained that “the many magistrates and militia
officers who ought to have given their aid and assistance in restraining and suppressing this
uproar were active to promote and encourage it.”67 While this conflict was relatively calm
compared to later confrontations between the British and colonists, the organization and
enthusiasm of 1775 was not simply random. Rather, it was built upon the convergence of crowds
and militias and fueled by the drive to create a new colonial identity, independent from the
Crown.
These rumbles of independence were threatening to the British, and General Gage was
under increased pressure “to come up with some sort of victory in the field.”68 But, “with travel
and transport difficult in winter, he made no… moves during December and January"; instead,
Gage spent the time gathering reports of the rebels’ organization and their supplies.69 For if Gage
could gather all of the patriot supplies, they would not pose a threat. Citing the growing rebellion
in some of the centers of rebellion, such as Worcester, Gage decided instead to march to Salem.
Salem was not only vulnerable, being accessible by both land and sea, but it also had significant
military stores. Additionally, Gage finally acted when during February he heard reports that the
town was planning to transport “eight field pieces.”70 Gage saw this as an opportunity to “greatly
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disconcert their schemes” and on February 26 he sent 240 troops by boat to Salem to seize these
pieces before they were transported.71
The British regiment, led by Colonel Alexander Leslie, was ill prepared to enter Salem.
Leslie’s ad-hoc offensive highlighted clear shortcomings of Gage’s planning. Not only did
Leslie’s men approach Salem on a Sunday morning, when Salem residents were already centrally
gathered at church, in the town center, but he chose a route that had a potentially impassable
final obstacle: a drawbridge.72 Leslie had not scouted the route and did not know about the
drawbridge, which blocked his men from reaching Salem. While Leslie argued that “he was upon
the Kings Highway and would not be prevented passing over the bridge,” his plea meant little to
Salem residents.73 Salem townsman James Barr responded to Leslie’s request, in true liberal
rhetoric, that “it is not the King’s Highway; it is a road built by the owners of the lots on the
other side, and no king, country or town has anything to do with it.”74 In Salem, the Crown no
longer controlled the land; rather, colonists owned it. In the case of both Yarmouth and Salem,
patriots’ actions indicate that communities were willing to take up arms to protect their own
military supplies.
Following Leslie’s embarrassing attempt to gather supplies from Salem, Gage dispatched
Captain John Brown and Ensign Henry De Berniere to gather information on the state of the
countryside, specifically the roads and bridges.75 Brown and De Berniere moved quickly through
the countryside, yet patriots were often aware of their arrival. In some cases, Brown and De
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Berniere were forced to flee towns just as a crowd formed to protest their presence.76 Although
they were forced to move quickly through the countryside, they did observe the regularity of
militia training. On the road to Worcester, they stopped at a local tavern, where they found “a
company of insurgents exercising near the house.”77 Breen describes their observations of the
company, “the local commander… assured them that they would emerge victorious over Gage’s
forces if they just remembered to have patience and courage… at the conclusion of his talk… the
whole company came into the house and drank until nine o’clock.78 Brown and De Berniere not
only observed how men were training, but also how intertwined militia training was in patriot’s
lives. At this time, there was very little separation between military service and society; they
were analogous in 1775 Massachusetts.
Now knowing more about how well prepared militia units were to respond to any British
march, Gage continued to search for his next step. Under increasing pressure from the Crown to
rein in the colonies, Gage “pressed ahead with his plan to seize military supplies.”79 In January,
Gage ordered a scouting trip to Concord to record the Patriot supplies, and discovered that in
Concord there was a “Magazine of Powder consisting of between Ninety and an Hundred
Barrels.”80 With this intelligence, Gage must have determined that a successful attack on
Concord make a significant dent in the patriot supplies. As soon as Brown and De Berniere
reported that the road was clear, Gage planned a march to Lexington and Concord.
Gage’s planning suggests that he did not expect or plan to exchange fire in the process. If
Gage had wanted to provoke a fight, he would have instead chosen to attack Worcester.
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Worcester not only had a majority of the rebel’s arms and powder, but it also had a large
population of militias ready and prepared to fight.81 A march on Worcester “would undoubtedly
trigger another mass mobilization of patriot forces.”82 Instead Gage’s “plans suggest that he
counted on avoiding hostilities.”83
Marching to Concord, he “tripled the number of troops, they departed in the dead of
night, and they chose a route that did not have a drawbridge.”84 Further, these troops traveled
light, a sign that Gage did not expect a major fight. The troops only “carried one day’s ration but
no knapsack… [And] No artillery or baggage accompanies the column.”85 Gage not only did not
expect a fight, but he thought that his men would be able to return in the morning unscathed.
John Shy suggests that “Gage hoped to make up in speed of movement what such a force lacked
in weight.”86 But Gage was in for a surprise. As the bells of Lexington’s church rang on the
morning of April 19, Patriots rushed to arms.
Hearing of the British regulars’ march, Paul Revere and William Dawes rushed to
Concord in the early morning of April 19, 1775, to warn colonists. Upon alarm, the bells of
Lexington meeting house rang, calling men like Sylvanus Wood of Woburn out of bed before
dawn.87 Wood “immediately arouse… [f]earing that there was difficulty there” grabbed his gun,
and “went in haste to Lexington.”88 There he discovered that the British troops were within half a
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mile. Joined by other men who had heard Williams Diman’s “beat to arms,” Wood paraded to
the north edge of Lexington Common and prepared to meet the British. 89 By the time the British
entered Lexington Common, thirty-eight men stood prepared to deter the British.
Just as Gage’s planning suggests that he did not expect a fight, neither did the Patriots. In
the preceding confrontations between British and the rebels, no shots had been fired between the
forces. While there had always been a significant threat of bloodshed, previously the Patriots and
British only sparred with words. But in Lexington, with the first draw of blood, the
Revolutionary effort gained support.
Suffering casualties at Lexington, the British continued to Concord, where they
encountered a surprisingly organized group of patriots. While Brown and De Bernier had
accurately scouted the route to Concord, they had not reported on the responsiveness of Concord
men.
Defeating the British in Concord, the militia successfully protected their supplies, and
continued escorting the British troops back to Boston. Surrounding Boston, the Patriots laid
Boston under siege. Citing this, many Boston residents relocated to the countryside in the weeks
following the commencement of the siege.90 Following the Patriots’ march of the British back to
Boston, the patriot forces organized in Cambridge.
Following the Battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19, there was no longer any
doubt that the patriot forces were prepared to fight. Lord Hugh Percy, a British officer at
Lexington and Concord, wrote that while the colonists were “very scattered” and fought in an
“irregular manner,” they were prepared for battle, and their strength should not be ignored.91 As
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he wrote, “whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob, will find himself very much mistaken.
They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about.”92
Percy was right to caution the British against disregarding the colonial forces, for during
the spring, New Englanders had fused the enthusiasm of the crowd with the organization of the
militia to create a new force that posed a significant threat to the British. Although this
temporary arrangement of militias and crowds proved to be effective in the shouting matches of
early 1775, the Patriots understood that to fight the British they would need to establish a formal
force. In other words, they needed an army.
On April 8, just prior to the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the Massachusetts
Provincial Congress issued a resolve to Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire to
prepare an army. The resolve noted that “the present dangerous and alarming situation of our
public affairs, renders it necessary for this colony to make preparations for their security and
defense, by raising and establishing an army.”93 This resolution continued to ask the states of
New England to report on the “number of men, in their opinion, [that] will be necessary to be
raised by the four New England governments for their general defense and report.”94 While it is
unclear if the states responded specifically to this claim, or to reports of Lexington and Concord,
they did send men in droves to Boston following reports of April 19 to assist the Patriot forces.
In the week following Lexington and Concord, New Englanders rushed to Cambridge.
Historians generally note that around 20,000 men gathered in Cambridge.95 But by the time that
Washington assumed control of the forces, “there were 16,000, of which fewer than 14,000 were
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fit for duty.”96 However, regardless of how many men actually gathered, the apparent growing
size of the patriot force at Cambridge was a source of concern for the British; for “never before
had there been anything like it.”97 While the British were rightly concerned about the quick
mobilization of New Englanders, they should have been also comforted by the high rates of
desertion among the soldiers at Cambridge.
Because colonial militias had developed with an intense localism, many soldiers who
found themselves at Cambridge left almost as soon as they got there. Of the 16,000 who gathered
in Cambridge, “more than 1,500 were sick, another 1,500 absent.”98 Given the general unrest
and disorganization of the first few days at Cambridge, it is not surprising that there is no
statistical data on the desertion rate of men who gathered there. Though records do indicate that
the men who arrived were inadequately prepared. Many men “from the nearer towns… had
[neither] brought a change of clothing; nor had anyone, arriving in the first few days.”99 Men’s
lightweight arrival suggests that few Patriots intended on remaining in Cambridge; rather they
were there to protect against the immediate threat of a strike men there were not interested in
remaining in Cambridge, and “desperately sought to return home.”100
The high rates of desertion became an ongoing problem amongst Patriot forces. General
Artemas Ward was appointed by the Massachusetts Committee of Safety on April 20 to
command the Patriot forces spoke against the desertion. Four days after arriving in camp, Ward
had observed such high rates of desertion that he pleaded for regular enlistments. As he wrote on
April 24: “My situation is such, that if I have no enlisting ordered immediately, I shall be left all
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alone.”101 Although Ward’s plea to Congress is quite dramatic, so was the situation in
Cambridge, men simply came and went as they pleased. Joseph Warren wrote to John Adams
that “as to the army, it is such a shifting, fluctuating state as to not be capable of a perfect
regulation. They are continually going and coming.”102 While it is unclear exactly why men left,
the desertion of Captain Winthrop Rowe’s New Hampshire Company suggests that men were
only interested in protecting their own communities.
In June 1775, eighteen men deserted from Rowe’s New Hampshire Company stationed in
Cambridge. These men argued that they “‘didn’t intend when they enlisted to join the army, but
to be station’d at Hampton’ on the New England Coast.”103 In other words, these men enlisted to
protect their own coast, not the state of Massachusetts.
This was a common frustration of soldiers: they primarily wanted to be connected to their
communities. Some militia contracts in 1775 went so far as to stipulate that soldiers could only
fight within a 150-mile radius from home.104 The limited reach of the men’s service ensured that
they were serving their local communities. This localism, founded in the militia traditions of the
17th century, continued to affect the men that assembled in Boston. The earliest colonial
settlements had survived by the quick actions of local men. This ability to quickly mobilize
served the colonists well in the first few months of 1775. But as the fighting shifted from the
countryside to the city, Patriots showed little interest in following the removed fight.
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Following the initial siege of Boston, colonists searched for additional ways to squeeze
the British out of Boston. The thousands of forces in Cambridge had little to do aside from
maintaining the siege. And so they kept on putting pressure on Gage in Boston. In June, Patriots
turned their attention to Charlestown. The plan to fortify Bunker Hill was not a new plan; it had
been suggested as early as May 12 “as part of the recommended fortifications between
Cambridge and Charlestown.”105 Because it was located “within long cannon range of Boston” it
was seen as potentially a great asset to the Patriots.106 But there was no formal plan to dig until
the Patriots received reports that the British were planning to fortify Bunker Hill. Hearing
intelligence that the British might be planning to make a move on Bunker Hill on June 14, the
Patriots mobilized.107
Colonists organized a march to Bunker Hill in two short days. There were no written
orders, just a report from the Committee of Safety on the sixteenth that requested "a detachment
of one thousand men…. [to] march to Charlestown, and entrench upon that hill.”108 The plan
was for men to dig under the disguise of night, and return back to Cambridge in the morning. But
the events of the seventeenth would prove to be more complicated.
The Battle of Bunker Hill was the first such battle, but it was not a small conflict. It was
an immense bloodbath. Of the 1,500 patriots who participated at Bunker Hill, 140 were killed,
271 were wounded, and 31 captured.109 Bourne observes that the British had a “grim” casualty
rate of 52%, with 226 men killed, 928 wounded.110

105

Nelson, 211.
Nelson, 211.
107
Bourne, 224.
108
Nelson, 220.
109
Bourne, 224.
110
Bourne, 224.
106

29

On the morning of the seventeenth General Putnam and General Prescott could not have
envisioned what was in store for them, for as the sun rose over Boston they continued to
encourage their men on. On the other side of the harbor, Gage had received reports on the
colonists’ efforts during the night. True to his personality, he still hoped to avoid conflict. When
Major General Henry Clinton reported back to Gage on the colonists’ entrenchment, Gage
“‘seemed to doubt their intentions’ and decided to do nothing until daylight revealed the extent
of the American preparations.”111 Though, as the sun rose, and the scale of the Patriots’
entrenchment became clearer, there was no longer any question of the Continentals’ intentions.
Gage ordered his forces to Charlestown, and the battle began.
It is generally thought that there was a high rate of desertion amongst the patriot forces at
Bunker Hill. While historians often cite this high rate as an example of wavering support for
battle, it is unclear how many patriot men actually deserted. Charles Royster comments that men
generally “left the fighting as soon as they could get away…. in squads of twenty, carrying one
wounded man.”112 James Nelson observes that William Prescott, who commanded the men in a
redoubt, reported that while he had started the day with 1,200 men in the morning, by the time
the British reached the redoubt, he had “perhaps one hundred and fifty men in the fort.”113 Both
the lack of desertion statistics and the general acceptance of desertions suggest that it was
common amongst Patriot forces at Bunker Hill.
The first few months of 1775 frame the Revolution as a revolution comprised of
independent colonists. There was an intense localism in both the militia system, and in the
activation of forces. As such, when it was in soldiers’ personal interest to fight the British, they
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did with more fervor and skill that the British had predicted. But when it was not in the interest
of their own community, men deserted. Colonists’ rush to arms at Fort William and Mary,
Salem, and at Lexington and Concord proved to the British that patriots were ready to take on
the British. But this colonial enthusiasm faded as the relationship between the war and the
community evolved. Colonists were increasingly separated from their main motivation:
protection of the their communities. This tension was aggravated by Washington’s appointment
as general of the colonial forces, for he was a man who adhered to the “mid eighteenth century
concept of warfare- an era in with which war and society were carefully separated.” 114

114

John Shy, “American Strategy: Charles Lee and the Radical Alternative,” in A People
Numerous and Armed: Reflection on the Military Struggle for American Independence (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1990), 147.
31

Chapter 3: Washington’s Election and Arrival
Following Lexington and Concord, the tension between the British and the patriots
developed into a militarized conflict.115 The Second Continental Congress met in early May to
discuss the future of colonial affairs, and specifically the increasing need to develop their own
military force. The Continental Congress established the Continental Army on June 15, 1775,
and appointed George Washington as Commander in Chief. Washington was chosen for his
ability to provide structure for the forces in Cambridge and unite all the colonies, northern and
southern.
In Cambridge, Washington met a force that was “both politically healthy and militarily
inefficient.”116 Politically, the forces in Cambridge were democratic, independent and
unorganized. While there may have been little cohesion in Cambridge, men did have significant
power in deciding both their own fates and the fate of their units. With the establishment of the
Continental Army, men no longer had a say in their leadership or service. But when Washington
arrived, he brought his affinity for the European style military systems to Cambridge and sought
to not only convert a “popular force into a respectable army” but also to convert “a New England
revolution…. [into] an American Revolution.” 117 Although the appointment of Washington was
necessary to preserve the revolutionary cause, he brought with him a new hierarchical structure
that undermined the informal connections that had tied men together, and ultimately aggravated
the already fragile commitment of the patriot men in Cambridge.
When the Second Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in early May,
following the events at Lexington and Concord, Washington’s appointment was anything but a
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foregone conclusion. The principle concern of the Congress was how the colonies were going to
address the increasingly strained relationship with the British. While Congress debated the path
of the colonies, during a “confused and highly improvisational moment within the Congress,”
Washington was appointed to Commander in Chief.118 Although Washington was elected
unanimously, Congress was not unanimous in the decision to prepare an army. As Joseph Ellis
observes, “more delegates could agree that Washington should lead the American army than that
there should be an American army at all.”119 Regardless, it was decided that if there was going to
be an army, it would be lead by Washington. The election of Washington, in the words of Ellis,
seemed “obvious” both given Washington’s affinity for structure and his being a southerner.120
However, the appointment of Washington may not have been as “obvious” as Ellis suggests.121
Both Washington’s military background and his interest in the position are questionable.
After the French and Indian War, Washington’s military efforts were magnified and
celebrated even as “his military experience was not great, [and] his services not outstanding.”122
He emerged from the French and Indian war as an ambitious, competent, “well-known and
highly respected figure in colonial America and Britain,” but this was surprising given his
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service.123 Barry Schwartz argues that Washington’s appointment reflected more the colonies’
need for leadership than Washington’s achievements. As Schwartz argues:
Washington was virtually deified by his generation, but there is no apparent
reason why he should have been. Although Washington was… intelligent and
accomplished, he was neither a brilliant nor a self-confident man, nor was his
experience precisely suited to the needs of this time.124
But Washington did have a reputation for bringing British-style order and organization to his
troops, something the Congress needed in their fledgling army.
Washington had a great affinity for the British military structure. As a leader in the
French and Indian War, he had “seemed determined to become more British than the British.”125
Interviewing senior British officers during the French and Indian War, Washington became
convinced of “the importance of self-control, consistency, distance from subordinates, and
strictness in dealing with enlisted men.”126 Fred Anderson explains Washington forcefully
implemented these values during the Revolution because “he longed to meet… [the British]
army he respected, and for years had sought to emulate, on equal terms.”127 Therefore, the
organizational reforms that Washington made to the army were of no surprise. Washington
clearly was appointed to both bring order to the army and to unite the army, two goals that he
achieved.
Washington was a Southerner, and his appointment reflected, in part, interest in tying the
colonies together. In a time when colonial unity was not guaranteed, Congress sought to unify
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the colonies in the fight against the British. With the main nexus of fighting in Boston, Congress
sought a way to extend the cause outside of Boston and activate the rest of the colonies.
Appointing Washington did just that. As a highly respected Southerner, he “would broaden
support for the war, pulling the Chesapeake provinces and perhaps the more southerly ones into
the fray.”128 This was essential, for if Congress was going to sanction the creation of an army, it
was important that that army represented and protected all of the colonies. If John Hancock, a
delegate from Massachusetts and the president of the Second Continental Congress had been
elected to Commander in Chief, as he hoped to be, the conflict would have been centered in
Boston with questionable support outside of New England. But the Congress was clear not to
elect Hancock; they chose Washington instead for he would bring order to, and broaden support
for, the Continental Army.
Arriving in Cambridge, Washington sought to unite and organize the forces, but faced the
unique resolution of New Englanders. In 1789, looking back at the war, George Washington
wrote in a draft of his inaugural address, that pointed that during the first few months of 1775,
the colonists had a “secret resource…. unknown to our enemy… the unconquerable resolution
of our Citizens.”129 But this unconquerable resolution that Washington speaks about was one of
the main challenges he faced during 1775. He, too, at times could not figure out how to conquer
the resolution of his men, which was deeply embedded in Cambridge as evidenced in the
ineffective communication, the loose hierarchical leadership, and the constant disorderly
conduct.
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In Washington’s first nine days in Cambridge, he learned quickly that there was a need
for new systems of communication and records, and more broadly, a new organizational
structure. Arriving in camp on July 3, 1775, he issued a single general order the same day that
asked colonels and commanding officers “to make two returns of the number of men in their
respective regiments; distinguishing such as are sick, wounded or absent on forlough: And also
the quality of ammunition each Regiment now has.”130 This order which, with “a regular army
would have been done in an hour,” took eight days.131 He did not conceal his frustrations in this
process. In a letter to Richard Henry Lee eight days later, Washington wrote about the results of
his initial order, noting that “I do not doubt but the Congress will think me very remiss in not
writing to them sooner but you may rely on it yourself, and I beg you to assure them, that it has
never been in my power till this day.”132 Washington’s frustration was understandable, given the
loose relationships between military leaders and men in Cambridge; order and communication
could not be established.
Upon arrival in Cambridge, Washington was struck at the informal hierarchy between
men and officers. He observed that men had little respect for their commanders and came and
went as they pleased; they shot their guns for the “pleasure of the sound,” and bathed freely in
the Charles, often in front of women.133 Mirroring Washington’s observations, Joseph Warren, an
active Massachusetts patriot, observed that the Continental Army was comprised of the “the most

130

Washington, George. General Orders, July 3, 1775, in The Papers of George Washington.
Revolution Series, Philander D. Chase, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985),
1:49. [Referenced from here on as WP].
131
Washington, to Richard Lee, July 10, 1775, WP, 1: 98
132
Washington, to Lee, WP, 1:98.
133
Middlekauff, 144; Washington, General Orders, August 22, 1775, WP, 1:346.
36

undisciplined, profligate crew that were ever collected to fight a war.”134 And the close
relationship between officers and their men made fighting units inefficient. This close
relationship, according to John Shy fostered “military inefficiency.”135 Colonists often abandoned
their units, failed to follow orders, and lacked respect for military leadership. Irrespective of how
one defines military inefficiency, it was clearly an issue in Cambridge.
Patriots were drawn independently to the cause by choice, and so they were accordingly
vocal in the decisions and actions of the army. As Baron von Stuben, the German-born major
general in the Revolutionary War observed, the Continentals “differed from European troops in
at least one regard: they wanted to know why they were told to do certain things. Unlike
European soldiers who did what they were told, the Continentals asked why.”136 Because
colonists believed strongly that they were fighting for their own liberty, they were compelled to
have a say in their actions, and required justification for their orders. They did not respect the
close adherence to order that Washington prescribed. Instead, they made decisions for
themselves, irrespective of the collective efforts.
James Kirby Martin argues that during the first phase of the war the forces “had an
individual character.”137 Men were often found to be “swearing, excessive drinking, assaulting
officers, deserting, or bounty jumping.”138 While these acts were harmful to the patriot cause,
they were at the time more a bother, with little major effect on strategy, than anything else. In
contrast, during later stages of the war (post 1776), such acts of defiance “took on more and
134
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more of a collective (and menacing) character.”139 This indiscipline shows, that while soldiers
still identified as individuals during 1775; they had the choice to fight or to protest. When
Washington arrived in Cambridge, he focused his efforts on reorganizing the force from a loose
collection of individuals to a unified fighting force, an army.
In Cambridge, Washington encountered a force that was still grounded in the local militia
and crowd traditions. Men organized and fought to protect their community, rather than the
collective interests of the colonies. Washington found “not so much a deficient army as an army
that worked exactly as the governments that organized it, the officers who led it, and the men
who filled its ranks expected it to work.”140 When Washington encountered the forces at
Cambridge, they functioned as they were designed.
Militia units were designed to respond to immediate threats that required quick action
rather than organized planned service. To defeat the British, Washington had to fight against that
militia tradition. As Fred Anderson phrases it best, Washington needed to “reform a whole set of
pernicious Yankee attitudes towards military service, and indeed complex beliefs about the
nature of war itself.”141 In changing the structure of the forces, Washington was changing not just
the structure of the army; he was also formalizing soldiers’ service, expecting them to abide by
formal military hierarchical relationships and standards of conduct.
On his second day in Cambridge, Washington issued a lengthy General Order designed to
communicate his vision for the army, which was centered on bringing discipline and order to
what was at the time anything but disciplined and orderly. As he wrote, “[i]t is required and
expected that exact discipline be observed, and due Subordination prevail thro’ the whole Army,
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as a Failure in these most essential points must necessarily produce extreme Hazard, Disorder,
and Confusion; and end in shameful disappointment and disgrace.”142 To ensure that order
“prevailed,” Washington worked from the top down to restructure the forces.
Prior to Washington’s appointment, the units formed in Cambridge functioned very much
like political units with democratically elected leaders. As Anderson observes, the leadership in
Cambridge was far more concerned with politics than with arms. He writes, “an officer who
raised volunteers for his rank had no choice but… ‘to make interest’ with his men, just as a
politician standing for election ‘made interest’ with his electors.”143 This phenomenon occurred
in most units, including a militia unit from Worcester, which found itself without a commanding
officer. Reflecting the historical democratic practices of militias, it was decided that
appointments would be determined by vote: “the town [Worcester] should elect the officers, and
these should elect the field officers.”144 Because colonists had an active role in appointing
officers, there was a close connection between officers and their men. And this close connection
often diminished the formal responsibilities of officers, as there was little separation between
soldiers and their officers.
This close connection, Washington argued, made it practically impossible to organize an
army. In a letter to Richard Henry Lee on August 29, Washington complains that officers were
often too busy “curry[ing] favour[s] with the men (by whom they were chosen, & on whose
Smiles possibly they may think they may again rely) seems to be one of the principal objectives
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of their attention.”145 This was no way to lead an army. So on his second day in camp, he started
to redefine the role of military leadership in Cambridge.
On July 4th, in his General Orders, Washington noticed that Proper Notice will be
taken of such Officers and Men, as distinguish themselves….[additionally] [a]ll
Officers are required and expected to pay diligent Attention, to keep their Men
neat and clean… they are also to take care the Necesarys be provided in the
Camps and frequently filled up to prevent their being offensive and unhealthy.146
By highlighting the responsibilities of “Officers and Men” Washington was illuminating the need
for leaders to respect the military hierarchy of the army. He was also constructing a new role for
military leadership, one based on his generalship and officers’ leadership. But his reforms did not
end there. Although he viewed it as a risky move, Washington sought to end the democratic
election of men to positions of leadership in the army. In a letter to John Hancock on July 10,
1775, Washington recognized that this was a risky proposition, “but the experiment is dangerous,
as the Massachusetts Men under the Priviledge of chusing their own Officers, do not conceive
themselves bound if those Officers are disbanded.”147 Although Washington questioned the
commitment of soldiers without their elected leaders, he determined that it was a necessary risk
in organizing and uniting the forces in Cambridge.
Just as he was tasked with uniting the colonies, Washington was also responsible for
uniting the colonial forces. In his July 4 General Order, Washington clearly connects the men in
Cambridge with the troops all along the Atlantic coast. As he writes, “the Troops of several
Colonies, which have been raised…. Into their Pay and Service: They are now the Troops of the
United Provinces of North America; and it is hoped that all Distinctions of Colonies will be laid
aside; so that one and the same spirit may animate the whole…. [in] the most essential service to

145

Washington, to Richard Henry Lee, August 29th, 1775, WP, 1: 372.
Washington, General Orders, July 4th, 1775, WP, 1:54-55.
147
Washington, to John Hancock, August 4, 1775, WP 1: 224.
146

40

the great and common case in which we are all engaged.”148 This proclamation of unity may
seem only natural given the creation of a national army. However, given the historic
independence of the militia units, his proclamation redefined the nature of military service in
Boston. Washington effectively displaced the local motives that led many men to Cambridge and
replaced those with the abstract “great and common cause in which we are all engaged.”149 It is
unclear, however, if this rhetoric had any significant effect on the men in Cambridge. In spite of
his attempts to restructure the force, Washington remained disappointed with the patriots in
Cambridge.
After two months of trying ineffectively to institute order in Cambridge. Washington
expressed disappointment with the Patriots’ service. On August 20, Washington wrote that the
men in Cambridge were an “exceedingly dirty and nasty people” who failed to keep “to their
duty and ma[ke] them watchful and vigilant.”150 Not only did Washington observe that
militiamen had little respect for their service, he wrote to Richard Henry Lee on August 29,
1775, that working with these militiamen was one of the largest challenges he had encountered:
“It is among the most difficult tasks I ever undertook in my life to induce these people to believe
that there is, or can be, danger till the Bayonet is pushed at their breasts… [this is a product of]
an unaccountable kind of stupidity in the lower class of these people.”151 Finally, Washington
concluded at the close of the summer that he would choose a “respectable army” over the
“popular force[s]” of 1775 any day.152
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Washington was increasingly convinced that the men in Cambridge could not and would
not fight in a revolution against the British. In an Open Letter to Congress on September 25,
1776, Washington finally concluded that the men in Cambridge, tied to their home, without
military skill, and accustomed to acting independently, were not capable of fighting the
Revolution. As he wrote:
To place any dependence upon militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.
Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life - unaccustomed to the
din of arms - totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill…makes them
timid and ready to fly from their own shadows... Men accustomed to unbounded
freedom, and no controul…without which, licentiousness, and every kind of
disorder triumphantly reign. To bring Men to a proper degree of Subordination, is
not the work of a day, a Month or even a year; and unhappily for us, and the cause
we are Engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in the
Army under my immediate Command, is in a manner done away by having such a
mixture of Troops as have been called together within these few Months.153
In 1776, Washington had little hope organizing the militia into an effective military force. As
this letter indicated, not only were the forces of 1775 unaccustomed to arms, but they were
unacquainted with military skills, knew unbound freedom, and showed little self-control.154
Given this lack of character, Washington, in his letter to Congress, suggested the formation of a
standing army. Washington understood the colonists’ fears of such a force. Addressing and
attempting to calm such fears, Washington wrote: “The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the
Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote; and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced
as we are, not at all to be dreaded.”155 Washington’s request for a standing army suggests that his
significant efforts to implement strict military standards in Cambridge had failed. He was unable
to establish the professional army he desired.
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While Washington was appointed to lead the Continental Army, his first task was to
establish such an army. Ideally, while the forces assembled in Cambridge, already in arms,
would comprise the army, Washington faced numerous, and ultimately overwhelming challenges
trying to convert what had been a politically motivated force into a military force. As the fall of
1775 demonstrates, Washington faced an almost impossible task as he tried to construct an army
from local men.

43

Chapter 4: After July
When Washington arrived in Cambridge in July, he had six months to establish an army
before the expiration of the first military contracts in December 1775. He worked vigorously
through his first two months in camp to define a hierarchical structure between men and officers
and to regulate behavior. Washington hoped that this army would be prepared to swiftly defeat
the British. For if the Continental Army was not able to defeat the British during the first military
contracts, which expired in December, Washington would have to reenlist men and literally
reform the army. Although Washington understood the dangers of the December deadline, he
initially hoped that victory over the British would be swift, and he would be home by December.
However, the conflict with the British entered a relatively calm period following his
arrival in Cambridge, effectively prolonging the conflict and postponing major conflict to 1776.
This calm period not only left Washington restless, but his men as well. With little visible need
to be removed from their hearth and home, both Washington and his soldiers longed to return
home. And so, while Washington had instituted new hierarchical organization, and stricter
behavior standards which he saw as necessary to establish an effective fighting force, the newly
formed Continental Army remained for the rest of the year in a calm state. Washington learned
that as the army remained inactive for the rest of the year, soldiers saw little need to re-enlist or
even stay at camp.
When Washington first arrived at Cambridge, the camp was still breathing with the
excitement of Bunker Hill, and he quickly turned his attention to preparing the newly formed
Continental Army for their next battle, citing reports that “it was highly probably Gage’s Troops
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would very Shortly attack our Army”.156 Noting the dangerous lack of supplies, he stressed that
“it (is) of such infinite Importance” that they receive additional supplies immediately.157
Washington was determined to be prepared for any fight that the British waged. Washington had
arrived in Cambridge ready to fight, but the events of 1775 were out of his control.
During the summer of 1775, there was no rumored attack, and Washington grew
increasingly frustrated as “soldiers on both sides settled into the monotonous routine of siege
warfare,” and seemed to have little interest in combat.158 On September 21, Washington wrote to
John Hancock, president of the Continental Congress that the “State of Inactivity in which this
Army has lain for some Time, by no Means corresponds with my Wishes.”159 This passive state
of the army surrounding Boston, led Washington to grow restless. He had little desire to sit
around and enjoy the “dull, sometimes sordid routine of camp life.”160 When Washington first
arrived in Cambridge, he wrote his wife Martha that he hoped to be home by the fall.161 But as
1775 continued, Washington realized that the siege was not progressing rapidly and that the
Continental Army would be stationed around Boston for far longer than he had initially
imagined. As Washington grew restless, so did his men.
Joseph Hodginks, initially from Ipswich, Massachusetts, lamented their passive state.
Writing to his wife Sarah on September 8, Joseph described the inactivity at Cambridge: “I have
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know news to rite to you only that the Enemy have not yet fired a gun or sent a Bum at our
People since I have Ben here Expect a few small arms.”162
The dormant state of the army fueled the gradual decline of enthusiasm for the war. As
Raphael observes, during the summer and fall of 1775 “little by little, the collective spirit of the
people, their furious patriotism, began to dissipate, eclipsed by private lives and personal
needs.”163 On October 6, Hodginks followed up his previous letter, observing that the men in
Cambridge were “Bewitcht about getting home.”164 Hodginks’ letters illustrate the deep pull to
return home that the men felt, fueled both by their inactivity in Cambridge and as well for
personal and financial reasons. As harvest season arrived in Cambridge men must have felt a
particular need to be home. Washington was aware that with little visible need for troops, men
saw little tangible reason for their encampment in Cambridge.
So Washington turned his attention to occupying his soldiers’ time. On September 8 he
even asked his General Officers, “how then shall we be able to keep Soldiers to their duty…
impatient to get home?”165 This impatient behavior aggravated his frustrations with the forces
and on September 21, he went so far as to say that he was surrounded by “mutinous behavior.”166
The growing disorder in Cambridge fueled Washington’s search for any expedition, battle, or
conflict. And thus in an ironic way, the boredom of early 1775 led Washington to seek out
conflict; the defensive patriots now turned to the offensive.
Washington now “in a situation which requires us to run all risques,” turned his attention
to British colonial holdings, for while the Continental Army could not sail to Britain, they could
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attack British territory in the New World.167 In the last five months of 1775, he sent a ship to
Bermuda to gather supplies, he thought of attacking Nova Scotia, he tried to persuade the West
Indies to join the colonial efforts, he formed an army of shipping vessels and finally sent men to
Canada.168 Washington staged a major excursion to Canada, the “fourteenth colony” to activate
his men, and assert the strength of the Continental Army. 169
Why Quebec?
Canada had become the “fourteenth colony” following the French and Indian war. The
Treaty of Paris in 1763, which concluded the war, ceded French control of land east of the
Mississippi River (including Canada) to the British. Quebec’s geographic importance, weak
military, negligible local support, and substantial supplies must have been factors Washington
considered in his decision to send troops to Canada.
Geographically, Quebec was of extreme strategic importance. As the gateway to the St.
Lawrence River, if the colonists could seize control of Quebec, they could close off one of the
major routes into America for British troops, and protect the Hudson Valley from attack from the
north. Additionally, not only was Quebec geographically important, it was also relatively weakly
protected.
A meager “small British garrison” protected Quebec. 170 The relatively week military
presence made Washington believe that Quebec simply “awaited conquering.”171 As he wrote to
John Hancock, “Quebeck in its present defenseless State must fall into his Hands an easy Prey.”
He continues, noting that after making “all possible inquiry… [I] Found nothing… to deter me
167
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from proceeding.”172 While Washington does not expand upon his specific research, he must
have gambled that the local French were not likely to support the British troops.
Following the Quebec Act of October 7, 1774, the British established political control
over Canada, with the creation of a royal governor and council institutionalizing their
governance.173 But since the Crown did now actively govern the territory, it remained relatively
weakly defended and supported.174 Further, due to the changing political control of Canada, from
French to British, there were weak allegiances between the French Canadians and the British
Crown. And while there was a “huge French population there… [that was] not necessarily proAmerican, [it] was believed to be deeply anti-British.”175 Washington hoped that this relative
neutrality would enable his men to enter Canada.
Therefore, when Benedict Arnold, who had gained fame in his previous capture of Fort
Ticonderoga and its guns, volunteered to lead a march to Quebec to attain additional supplies,
Washington supported him. Arnold argued that a siege of Quebec would be “advantageous” for
the colonists, a great military asset, but the colonists would be able to gather there and with
“provisions of every kind [which were] plenty” which could supply the colonists.176
Together, these factors convinced Washington to send a force to Quebec in an effort to
both secure the St. Lawrence River, and gather supplies. Washington decided prior to his arrival
in Cambridge to “order preparations…. ‘To facilitate any future operation’” into Canada.177 With
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Congress’s support, Washington began to work with Benedict Arnold in August 1775 to plan an
expedition to Quebec.
During the third week in August, Washington worked with Benedict Arnold to gather the
supplies and men for an expedition to Quebec. In a letter to Phillip Schyler on August 20,
Washington estimated that he could spare “a Detachment of 1,000 to 1,200 men.”178 Two weeks
later, on September 5, Washington’s General Orders called for a regiment comprised of “active
woodsmen, well acquainted with bateaus.”179 Following this General Order, the men in
Cambridge surprised both Washington and defied recruitment expectations, and rushed to
volunteer for this expedition. It is unclear why specifically men felt so compelled to enlist,
though it is plausible that, given the growing inactivity of forces in Cambridge, men were simply
bored and itching for action.
Arnold left Cambridge on September 11 with 1,050 men from Massachusetts and New
York.180 While he had consulted with Maine residents such as Reuben Colburn and Samuel
Goodwin to gather information about the Kennebec River, he was unprepared for the journey.181
The trials of Arnold’s expedition to Quebec are numerous. During the arduous path to Quebec,
the expedition suffered from the daily physical challenges, food shortages, and desertions. On
September 30, the nineteenth day of the journey, Arnold had 950 men, but this number quickly
decreased thereafter.182 Most dramatically, on October 25, Colonel Roger Enos and his battalion
of 450 men defected, turning back to Boston, leaving Arnold with 500 men, less than half the
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force he had leaving Cambridge.183 Additionally, by the time that Arnold finally reached Quebec,
and even with the addition of General Montgomery’s expedition (which had traveled up along
the Hudson River to join Arnold to seize Quebec), the forces that gathered on December 31 were
comprised of around 300 men, nearly a third of the forces that had set out for Quebec months
earlier.184
The Quebec campaign was unsuccessful for a number of reasons. The forces were a
fraction of what Washington initially planned and envisioned. But more importantly, due to the
expiring contracts of the soldiers on December 31, Arnold and Montgomery were forced to
attack before their men deserted their positions (remember that the military contracts expired at
the end of December). Montgomery tried to persuade men to reenlist; but he was unsuccessful.
Rather, while Montgomery pleaded “with them to sign on only until April 15 or until
reinforcements arrived, which might be as early as late January…. there were few takers,”185 On
December 31, when Arnold and Montgomery tried to besiege Quebec, everything went wrong.
“Montgomery was shot dead; Arnold was seriously wounded in the leg; dozens of other men
became casualties or prisoners.”186 Historian James Kirby Martin goes so far as to argue that this
attack on Quebec was a “hopeless” endeavor that neither Arnold nor the patriot forces ever
recovered from.187
When news reached Cambridge of the defeat at Quebec and the death of Montgomery,
Washington blamed the weak commitment of men for the failure. On February 1, 1776,
Washington wrote to Joseph Reed, a Pennsylvania delegate in Congress and the Continental
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military secretary, that “the evils arising from the short, or even any limited enlistments of the
troops, are greater, and more extensively hurtful that any person… can form any idea of.”188 The
short enlistment of soldiers had led to the premature and unsuccessful assault of Quebec. If
Montgomery had been able to extend soldiers service into 1776, his forces could have waited till
reinforcements arrived. But instead, his men voted to return home at the end of their service. By
choosing to return home on January 1, men effectively placed the importance of their personal
need over the collective needs of the Continental Army. If the men who arrived in Quebec had
been committed to the Siege of Quebec, men would have voted to stay, extended their
enlistment, and waited to plan a more successful attack, as opposed to a forced premature attack.
With the expiration of the army’s first contracts at the end of December 1775, the entire
Continental Army had to reenlist men.
Washington was painfully aware of the impact of soldiers’ contracts expiring at the end
of 1775. Through the fall of 1775 Washington wrote numerous letters to express his growing
frustrations with the men in Cambridge, their weak commitment to the Continental Army, and
their failure to reenlist for 1776. On November 28, he wrote that the “dirty, mercenary spirit
[which] pervades the whole…. [combined with the] dearth of publick spirit and want of virtue…
will prove the destruction of the army.”189 Washington was sure that the expiring contracts of
1775 would destroy the Continental forces. And he was right. While Washington was ultimately
able to rebuild the army, it was not easy.
1776 brought new developments to the Revolution. As contracts expired on December
31st, many men returned home. Additionally, when the British officially abandoned Boston on
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March 17, the siege of Boston concluded, and many colonists who had been displaced in the
spring of 1775 simply left. As colonists returned home, the nature of enlistment changed. For in
1776, soldiers fought to protect the budding nation, rather than their community.
1775 had proved that when men were both in close proximity to their home and to the
enemy, they would fight ferociously. But absent this local connection and threat to their
community, men had little interest in fighting. This was evidenced by both the high rate of
desertion in the army, and as well, the weak rate of reenlistment between 1775 and 1776.
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Conclusion
This thesis has explored the foundation, formation, and subsequent disintegration of the
enthusiasm and widespread support for the Revolutionary cause in 1775. While much has been
written about the first few months of 1775, historiography has largely focused on either the role
of Founding Fathers or popular forces independently of each other. But the events of 1775 prove
that these two groups were intimately connected. For while the popular forces sparked the
revolutionary movement, the formal leadership struggled as they were tasked to convert a local
informal political uprising into a formal national military force. Eventually, as 1775 closed in
Quebec, it became clear to General Washington and others that their attempts to leverage the
Cambridge encampment into a fighting Continental Army had been largely unsuccessful.
With the expiration of the army’s first military contracts on January 1, and the conclusion
of the Siege of Boston on March 17, 1776, men who had fought in 1775, or who had been
displaced, returned home. When they were asked to reenlist in the army, they declined, for they
had no motivation to, they had returned home. Soldiers had mobilized in the first instance to
protect and defend their communities, but as the conflict became more national in scope their
interest waned.
This is not to say that men did not continue to enlist in the army. There are a plethora of
journals and diaries such as Joseph Plumb Martin’s which document the lives of soldiers who
enlisted in 1776 for the duration war. But the men who enlisted in 1776 were committed to an
army for the protection of the colonies, in contrast to the collective forces of 1775 that were
bound to, and motivated by, their separate local allegiances.
The fleeting enthusiasm and brief service of New Englanders in 1775 highlights the
importance of integrating formal and informal systems of protection. During the first few months
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of 1775 New England society grew with unrest as Patriots from all classes united to protect their
communities. But with Washington’s appointment, the local threats that had originally
compelled patriots to fight no longer existed; it had been displaced by the formal Continental
Army focused on protecting all the colonies. The widespread deification of the “citizen soldier”
must be reconsidered. For it was not Patriots’ identity as a “citizen soldier” that created the
amazing rush to arms in early 1775, it was, rather, the convergence of crowds and militias. Next
to the Minute Man statue in Concord, there should be another statue of his unit comprised of
family, neighbors, and friends, walking back home from Cambridge as they returned home, still
with a plow in one hand and a musket in the other.
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